This paper studies mandatory disclosure documents filed during the period 1933-35 in response to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Our sample companies are all listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and therefore subject to the NYSE's disclosure requirements at the time of the regulatory filings. We ask whether the additional disclosures contained in the filed documents constitute information. Using newly-available daily price, volume, and bid and ask quotation data, we test whether the filings are associated with changes in bid-ask spreads, return autocovariance, turnover, volatility, or no-trade days. We find almost no evidence that the new disclosures required by the securities laws-principally having to do with management compensation and large shareholdings-reduced informational asymmetry.
Introduction
Securities laws around the world require that publicly-traded companies make particular financial and narrative disclosures to regulators and investors. When such laws do not exist or do not apply, firms may make disclosures voluntarily or pursuant to an agreement with the exchange or other market on which their shares are listed. Mandatory disclosure laws are motivated by a belief that these voluntary or contractual disclosures are sub-optimal or insufficiently credible. This paper studies mandatory disclosure documents filed during the period 1933-35 in response to the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). Our sample companies are all listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and therefore subject to the NYSE's disclosure requirements at the time of the regulatory filings. We ask whether the additional disclosures contained in the filed documents constitute information. Using newly-available daily price, volume, and bid and ask quotation data, we test whether the filings are associated with changes in bid-ask spreads, return autocovariance, turnover, volatility, or no-trade days.
The empirical literature on the effects of mandatory disclosure laws is small and inconclusive. A few papers test whether the Securities Act affected the returns realized by investors in new issues of stock (Stigler 1964; Simon 1989) . Benston (1973) examines the effects of the periodic financial disclosures required by the Exchange Act.
More recently, Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) and Ferrell (2004) examine the effects of a 1964 statute that extended the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure provisions to companies traded over the counter and Daines and Jones (2005) examine the long-run impact of the Exchange Act on bid-ask spreads.
Most of these papers look at long-run stock returns for affected companies before and after enactment of the disclosure laws or compare post-enactment returns for affected and unaffected companies. Our paper employs a different methodology for evaluating the effects of mandatory disclosure. We look for changes in the short-run trading behavior of the affected stocks around the time the company files a disclosure document, using high frequency (daily) data and focusing on microstructure measures that can provide evidence of reduced informational asymmetry. We also measure the informativeness of earnings reports before and after the enactment of the securities laws.
If those laws improved the quality of information that companies released to the market, then earnings reports should be of higher quality, and therefore more informative, after
1934.
We find almost no evidence that the new disclosures required by the securities laws-principally having to do with management compensation and large shareholdings-reduced informational asymmetry. We also find no evidence that earnings reports were more informative after enactment of the securities laws. We conclude that the securities laws did not add measurably to the content and credibility of the NYSE's existing disclosure requirements.
Despite the relative dearth of empirical investigation, the role of public regulation and enforcement in securities markets is a vitally important topic (La Porta et al. 2005) .
Researchers have debated whether securities laws can reduce the cost of capital by reducing manager-shareholder agency problems, providing a standard-form contract that saves shareholders and managers the cost of negotiating over disclosure policy, or debiasing overconfident investors. Dozens of emerging-market countries currently face choices similar to those the United States made in the 1930s. Understanding the impact of those choices is valuable.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Section 3 summarizes prior findings on the effects of mandatory disclosure laws. Section 4 describes our data and methodology, and Section 5 discusses the results of our tests of the effects of the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Section 6 analyzes the effects of earnings releases before and after enactment of the securities laws, and Section 7 concludes.
The 1930s disclosure laws
Prior to 1933, listed companies' disclosure policies were largely determined by their managers and the stock exchange(s) that listed their shares. Many state governments had a "blue sky" law under which the sale of securities in that state triggered certain disclosure requirements. However, the blue sky laws of several states, including New York, did not require specific disclosures but merely prohibited fraud (Mahoney 2003) . Although it was not always clear how these laws applied to multi-state transactions, if the buyer's broker were located in New York and the broker took delivery for the buyer, it is probable that only New York's blue sky law would apply regardless of the buyer's residence (Loss & Cowett 1958) . Thus, blue sky laws did not create a broadly applicable mandatory disclosure system. State public utility laws and the federal Interstate Commerce Act imposed some disclosure requirements on public utilities and interstate railroads, respectively, to aid in rate regulation.
The Securities Act became law on May 27, 1933 and required registration with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of any securities sold to the public on or after July 27, 1933. Because the Act permitted sales no sooner than 20 days after filing, the FTC accepted registration statements beginning on July 7. The statute included a schedule of required disclosures but gave the FTC broad authority to determine their form and content. Accordingly, in early July 1933, the FTC adopted Form A-1 as the primary registration form. Additional forms were adopted over time for various categories of issuers and offerings.
The Exchange Act became law on June 6, 1934. It required each company with securities listed on an exchange to file an application (also called a registration statement but distinct from a Securities Act registration statement) and then to update the required information annually. The statute also created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and made it the administering agency for both the Securities Act and Exchange Act, replacing the FTC. In September 1934, the SEC announced that it would grant temporary registration until June 30, 1935 to companies already listed on an exchange.
In February 1935, it adopted Form 10, the primary form for permanent registration.
Form 10 requires narrative and financial information about the company substantively similar to that of Securities Act Form A-1. Initial Form 10s were due no later than July 1, 1935, the day after temporary registration expired.
Importantly, one cannot determine on a priori grounds whether the disclosures required in Securities Act and Exchange Act filings should have improved traders' ability to value securities issued by NYSE-listed companies. Form A-1 calls for information similar to that required for an initial listing on the NYSE and Form 10 calls for information similar to the NYSE's ongoing disclosure requirements for listed companies.
The listing requirements are discussed in Meeker (1930) The securities laws were motivated partly by a belief that the NYSE's disclosure requirements, although impressive on paper, were not vigorously enforced (Seligman 1983 ). The Securities Act and Exchange Act created liabilities for erroneous disclosures and gave the FTC (later the SEC) the authority to prevent companies from selling securities to the public if it concluded that the disclosures were incomplete or misleading.
Even if the content of the mandated disclosures were identical to the NYSE-required disclosures, then, the SEC-required disclosures could be informative if the enforcement mechanisms made them more reliable.
1933 and 1934 were moribund years for public offerings. Moreover, some of the major investment banks, unhappy with the Securities Act's liability provisions, refused to underwrite new issues while they bargained (successfully) with Congress to reduce underwriters' statutory liabilities (Seligman 2003) . Perhaps to ward off criticism, the FTC (and later the SEC) publicized its work by issuing press releases that listed the most recent registration statement filings and occasionally made a pitch for more new issues by arguing that the registration process was less difficult and costly than critics claimed.
These press releases, which are available through the LEXIS/NEXIS service, were issued at least weekly. A filing by a prominent company was often the subject of a stand-alone press release, typically issued the day after the filing. In March through June 1935, the SEC also issued press releases nearly every business day identifying the listed companies that had filed Form 10 registration statements required under the Exchange Act.
3.
Prior studies of the securities laws Stigler (1964) specification error. This is surely a concern for any studies that include the 1930s, when the economy was in severe distress followed by recovery.
Second, long-term returns may underestimate the impact of reduced informational asymmetry depending on the length of the interval over which returns are measured.
Consider a company that unexpectedly improves its disclosure practices, either voluntarily or because of a change in law. If the new disclosure regime reduces investors' uncertainty about future company performance, the risk of holding the stock will decline. Expected returns should therefore decline as well, leading to a one-time jump in price. Long term cumulative returns combine these two return components-an abnormally high short-term return around the time of the new disclosure regime, followed by a drop in long-term returns. These two components offset partly or entirely, depending on the length of time over which long-run returns are measured. Figure 1 shows the analysis graphically.
In addition, our research focus differs somewhat from that of the prior literature.
We do not attempt to determine whether the Securities Act or Exchange Act were, on balance, beneficial to investors. Rather, we ask simply whether the disclosures mandated by the FTC and SEC under authority of those statutes constituted information as to companies already listed on the NYSE. Alternatively, one might pose the question as whether the NYSE's disclosure requirements already produced information substantively identical to that mandated by the securities laws. We believe this is a critical policy question because it sheds light on whether disclosure regulations need to be concerned with companies traded on relatively liquid, organized markets.
Data and Methodology
Our basic research design is to compare various microstructure measures that proxy for changes in information asymmetry for brief periods before and after a Securities Act or Exchange Act filing. We use daily return, volume and bid and ask quotation data obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago (CRSP). At the time of writing, CRSP was in the process of extending its daily data back to 1926 and had produced a preliminary "beta cut" covering the years 1926-1935. Our study uses the preliminary data. The CRSP daily data end at December 31, 1935. For two of our sample companies, the 30-day post-filing window ends three or four business days after that date. We hand-collect price, bid-ask spread, and volume data for those two companies from the New York Times, the underlying source of the CRSP data.
standards. Leuz (2003) uses bid-ask spreads and turnover as proxies while comparing U.S. generally accepted accounting principles and international accounting standards.
Bid-ask spreads are widely viewed as a direct measure of informational asymmetry because rational market makers respond to adverse selection risk by increasing their quoted spreads (Glosten & Milgrom 1985) . We accordingly take the percentage spread (the difference between daily closing ask and bid prices divided by their midpoint) as our first proxy.
Published bid-ask spreads will not capture the effective spread if trades take place inside the quoted bid and ask prices. Roll (1984) argues that the covariance of successive price changes provides a measure of the effective spread. He notes that random arrival of buy and sell orders should produce negative covariance between returns and lagged returns as prices "bounce" between the (effective) bid and ask prices. If the effective spread decreases but the pattern of order arrival remains the same, the absolute value of the autocovariance (which, unlike correlation, is sensitive to scale), will decrease as well.
We accordingly measure the first-order autocovariance of daily returns and use it as a proxy for effective spreads.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) demonstrate that informational asymmetry and liquidity are inversely related.
2 Intuitively, uninformed traders should be more willing to trade as the risk of making losing trades to better-informed traders decreases. We use share turnover as defined by Lo and Wang (2000)-the number of traded shares divided by total shares outstanding-as our first proxy for liquidity. We also use a separate proxy appropriate to our setting. Bekaert et al. (2005) contend that in emerging markets, the percentage of days on which a stock does not trade serves as a natural measure of liquidity.
3 Jiang, Mahoney and Mei (2005) note that no-trade days are common for individual stocks on the NYSE in the late 1920s. We therefore use the percentage of notrade days as an additional liquidity measure.
Following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), we also measure the time-series volatility (standard deviation) of returns before and after registration statement filings while recognizing that this may be a less reliable measure of informational asymmetry. West (1988) argues that idiosyncratic volatility should be decreasing in informational efficiency, and Kelly (2005) provides confirming empirical results. Nevertheless, as
Kelly notes, one could argue alternatively that rapid reflection of information should lead to more nearly discontinuous jumps in prices and thus higher volatility. 4 We apply these measures to a sample of companies that filed Securities Act registration statements and then to a sample of companies that filed Exchange Act registration statements. We identify every NYSE-listed firm that filed a Securities Act registration statement and the dates of those filings during the period beginning July 7, 1933 (the first day on which registration statement filings were accepted) and ending in early November 1935. To do so, we check by hand the FTC and SEC press releases described above against a list of NYSE companies. In all, 58 NYSE-listed companies filed 70 registration statements during our sample period. In a few instances, the same company filed two registration statements covering different classes of securities within a few weeks of each other. In those cases, the company-specific information in the two 3 Technically, they use days on which there is no price change as a measure of liquidity because their data do not include trading volumes. 4 Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) also show that large idiosyncratic volatility at the aggregate level is an indication of more efficient stock market.
删除的内容: They show that this measure is more closely related to returns than the turnover measure.
filings should be essentially identical, so we consider only the first filing. This reduces our final sample to 65 registration statements. Table 1 lists the sample companies, their registration statement filing dates, and the type of security sold. Because our tests require pre-event data, we limit ourselves to seasoned offerings. Our sample therefore does not include initial public offerings.
We also collect Form 10 filing dates (that is, the date on which the company registered under the Exchange Act) for all NYSE listed companies. We begin with the 696 companies listed on the NYSE for which CRSP has daily data as of January 1, 1935.
The SEC temporarily exempted non-U.S. companies from the filing requirement, which eliminates five companies. We also eliminate interstate railroads (SIC code 4000) because they were already subject to mandatory disclosures under the Interstate Commerce Act. The SEC adopted a separate registration form for railroads that incorporated the disclosures they were already required to make. Of the remaining 636 companies, we are able to identify Exchange Act filing dates for 604, or 95%. We lose an additional six companies because of missing data, leaving us with a sample of 598 companies.
Our pre-filing and post-filing windows vary depending on whether the filing was made under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act. The Securities Act mandates a "quiet period" around the time of the initial filing, during which the issuing company and its underwriters may not publicize the offering. The issuing company and its underwriters typically waited a brief period while the SEC reviewed the registration statement filing, then distributed a preliminary version of the prospectus (Loss & Seligman 1989 ). Thus, the registration statement contents became public knowledge only with a delay. It is also unlikely that members of the underwriting syndicate would have traded on the information contained in the registration statement during the quiet period, given the SEC's view that such trading may be manipulative.
We define a pre-filing period of 30 trading days ending 20 trading days prior to the filing and a post-filing period of 30 trading days beginning 20 trading days after the filing. 5 The Securities Act provides that a registration statement becomes effective, and the securities can therefore be sold, 20 calendar days after filing. This 20-day period is subject to various exceptions, but it is clear from SEC press releases that-contrary to current practice-most registration statements did become effective after only 20 calendar days in the early 1930s. The Act also required that each purchaser receive a prospectus containing most of the information contained in the registration statement.
We therefore believe that the information in a registration statement should be widely available to the market by the start of our post-filing period. To the extent the disclosures in the registration statements constitute information, informational asymmetry should be lower in the post-filing than in the pre-filing period.
Although the FTC or SEC press releases usually provide the actual filing dates for Securities Act registration statements, in a few cases they do not. We then assign a filing date based on the average delay between filings and press releases. Because there is a 40 trading-day window between our pre-filing and post-filing periods, a few days' error in estimating filing dates should not matter. The earliest filing date in our sample is August 28, 1933 and the latest is November 4, 1935; the median filing month is May, 1935.
It is not clear how long any changes in spreads, liquidity, and volatility should persist after the dissemination of a disclosure document, assuming that document reduces informational asymmetry. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) argue that a commitment to improved disclosure should have stronger and more durable effects than a single voluntary disclosure. We believe that the initial Securities Act or Exchange Act filings occupy an intermediate point on this scale-they demonstrate that the subject company intends to access the public (rather than private)
capital markets and maintain a listing (rather than migrating to the over-the-counter market), thus committing to ongoing mandatory disclosures. In the event, however, our results remain qualitatively similar if we use shorter time periods or begin the "postfiling" measurement period immediately after a Securities Act filing.
Exchange Act filings, unlike Securities Act filings, should be rapidly reflected in transaction data. There is no "quiet period" for Exchange Act filings. Moreover, companies were required to provide the filing to the exchange on which they were listed simultaneously with the filing. Member brokers, then, should have had access to any news contained in a Form 10 from the day of filing. We accordingly define the pre-filing period as the 30 trading days ending on day -1 and the post-filing period as the 30 trading days beginning on day +1. Day 0 is the day on which the SEC announced the filing, which may have been the day of or the day after the actual filing.
It is also important to note that most of our sample companies had publicly released their annual reports weeks or months in advance of their Form 10 filings. Thus, the companies' earnings and other basic financial results for 1934 should already have been reflected in prices at the time of the Form 10 filings. By contrast, the Form 10 filing was the first occasion on which many NYSE companies disclosed detailed information about management compensation and principal shareholdings. The New York Times summarized this information for many NYSE companies on the day after the filing, again suggesting that the information should be rapidly reflected in trading data. Table 2 contains summary data for the 18 companies undertaking private placements. The Securities Act filers are, on average, smaller than the companies in this sample. However, their bid-ask spreads are narrower (although not significantly so and the autocovariance is actually more negative) and they are noticeably more liquid ( only turnover, by a statistically significant amount). Thus, we do not have strong evidence for a selection bias.
Effects of Securities Act and Exchange Act filings

I. Post-filing changes in informational asymmetry measures
In Table 3 These results provide only modest evidence that Securities Act filings constituted information as to companies already subject to NYSE disclosure policies. However, this could be a consequence of a small sample and consequently low power or a result of selfselection by companies filing Securities Act registration statements.
Fortunately, Exchange Act filings should not be subject to either of these complications. Because nearly all NYSE firms were required to, and did, file Form 10s, the set of Exchange Act filers is much larger than that of Securities Act filers and the power of our tests will be accordingly larger. For the same reason, Exchange Act filings should not be subject to self-selection bias. An NYSE listed company could avoid The stock prices of several of those companies declined below one dollar per share just before delisting, suggesting that the delisting was a consequence of bankruptcy.
Exchange Act filings should accordingly raise little or no self-selection problem. We attempt to control for these effects using a difference in differences test.
II. Difference in Differences Estimates
The before-and-after analyses to this point are simple comparisons of means. In the case of Securities Act filings, the offering itself has an information content separate from that of the accompanying disclosures for which we have not controlled. Fortunately, we have a reasonable-but small-control sample consisting of companies that made 6 Once again, these results are robust to using a shorter window after the Form 10 filings.
删除的内容: although very private placements. Any changes in spreads, liquidity, or volatility caused by the fact of raising new capital should be similar between the registered and unregistered offerings.
Only the former, however, were subject to mandatory disclosure under the Securities Act. Table 5 shows the post-filing change in spreads, liquidity, and volatility for the companies making registered public offerings and private placements, respectively, and the difference between them. The signs of the difference-in-differences do not reliably indicate reduced informational asymmetry and none of the estimates is significantly different from zero. In general, the post-filing behavior of the unregistered offerings is quite similar to that of the registered offerings, suggesting that any changes are a consequence of capital raising rather than disclosure.
We lack a similar control sample for Exchange Act filers because all exchangetraded companies were required to file a Form 10 registration statement in the first half of 1935. Accordingly, we exploit the small differences in the timing of filings among our sample companies.
We create two subsamples from our sample of Exchange Act filings as diagrammed in Figure 3 . An "early filer" subset consists of those companies that filed show improvements in information asymmetry measures. Combining the two tests, each subset serves as a control group for the other, permitting us to use a difference-indifferences estimator. Table 6 shows the before-and-after changes for the early and late filer subsets. We cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that market-wide improvements were themselves a consequence of the new regulatory structure. There may have been some uncertainty in early 1935 about whether NYSE firms would be able and willing to comply with the Exchange Act. Some companies announced that they would challenge the constitutionality of the registration requirement. Perhaps once it became clear that most NYSE listed companies would submit to SEC oversight, that uncertainty was largely resolved and market conditions improved in consequence. The tests described in section 6 are designed to deal with this possibility.
III. Regression-adjusted model
One possible concern with the difference in differences results for Exchange Act filers is that the companies that filed in early April could differ systematically from those that filed in late May. There is no readily apparent evidence that the filings were strategically timed-it appears that companies whose fiscal years ended in September, October or November tended to file earlier than those whose fiscal years ended at December 31. Nevertheless, we use a cross-sectional regression to control for other differences among filers. In particular, we consider firm size, as measured by the log of average market capitalization for the month of March 1935. We also employ the industry dummy variables defined by Fama and French (1997) .
We estimate the following regression for each of our five proxies for informational asymmetry: The results, with industry dummies suppressed, are shown in Table 7 . Market capitalization enters significantly in many of the specifications. However, in none of them is there a significant difference between the early and late filer categories, and the estimated coefficients often have the wrong sign. 7 To this point, then, we have no strong evidence that Securities Act or Exchange Act filings are associated with reductions in informational asymmetry. 7 We estimated similar regressions for the Securities Act filings, but because of the small sample they have very low power and almost none of the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero. We do not report those results here.
IV. Another Measure of Information Asymmetry
As a final check, we use a conditional measure of information asymmetry inspired by Wang (1994) We estimate the following regression designed to capture the dynamic volumereturn relation before and after Securities Act or Exchange Act filings: 
where for stock i on date t, RET i,t is return, TURNOV i,t is turnover, and D i,t equals one if day t is in the post-filing period for stock i and zero otherwise. γ is negative but not significant. The estimated coefficient θ has the expected sign but is insignificant. We also find that the results are quite robust to different specifications of TURNOV. Once again, we fail to find evidence that securities law filings reduced informational asymmetry.
Effects of earnings reports
Another means of determining whether the securities laws improved the informational environment is to consider the effects of earnings reports. Securities law filings may not be informative even though the securities laws improved the informational environment for listed companies. Once listed companies realized that they would be subject to SEC filing requirements on an ongoing basis, they may have improved the quality of their voluntary disclosures to match the information they would be disclosing in regulatory filings. This would tend to decrease the informational impact of the regulatory filings themselves. Bailey, Kaorlyi and Salva (2004) find that the market impact of earnings announcements increases when non-U.S. firms list in the United States, which is consistent with the hypothesis that shifting to a better disclosure regime improves the quality of earnings announcements.
To investigate this possibility, we test whether shareholder reports and earnings announcements became more informative after enactment of the federal securities laws. Importantly, the plots do not show a larger reaction to earnings reports in 1935, suggesting that traders did not view them as more credible or high-quality than in 1927.
We test whether this is so by looking at the comparative post-announcement changes in our microstructure measures, focusing on a short event window. Following Bhattacharya et al.'s (2000) study of earnings announcements in Mexico, we focus on days -1 to +2 in event time, where day zero is the day the report appeared in the New York Times. Table 9 shows post-announcement changes in bid-ask spreads, turnover, no-trade days and volatility for the 1927 and 1935 earnings reports. Because our event window is only 4 days long, we do not measure return autocovariance. In both 1927 and 1935, liquidity increases by an economically and statistically significant amount around the time of earnings reports. Bid-ask spreads decrease in both instances, although only the 1927 difference is significantly different from zero. There is, however, strong evidence that earnings reports in both years reduce informational asymmetry.
Importantly, the reduction is not greater in 1935. Not surprisingly, background market conditions are much better in 1927-trading costs as measured by bid-ask spreads are much lower and liquidity is much higher. But the percentage improvement in these measures around the time of an earnings report is in each case either greater than or the same as that in 1935. This result is robust to controlling for market capitalization, whether the earnings increased or decreased year-on-year, and whether the earnings report is described as "preliminary." There is no evidence that the securities laws improved the informativeness of company disclosures generally.
Conclusions
This paper employs a new methodology for evaluating the effects of mandatory disclosure. We look for changes in the short-run trading behavior of the affected stocks around the time the company filed a disclosure document, using high frequency (daily) data and focusing on microstructure measures that can provide evidence of reduced informational asymmetry. We fail to find evidence that the securities laws of the 1930s improved the informational environment for investors in companies already traded on the NYSE. Our results, like those of Simon (1989) , suggest that the NYSE's disclosure requirements already provided investors with information of equivalent content and reliability to that available under the securities laws.
There are, however, two important limitations to keep in mind when considering lessons for other markets. First, the NYSE had a dominant market position and was therefore able to induce companies to agree to disclosure standards that they may not have otherwise been willing to accept. In that sense, the NYSE's experience in enforcing a contractual disclosure system may be better than could be achieved by a less powerful securities exchange.
Second, the United States in 1930 had a well-functioning legal system capable of enforcing contracts and deterring fraud. The federal securities laws added another "cop on the beat," but (despite the claims of the laws' proponents) the market was not completely lawless prior to the SEC's arrival. In the context of an efficient and noncorrupt legal system, our findings suggest that a securities regulator may not improve much on the results of voluntary and contractual disclosures. *, ** denotes significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The "before filing" period for each company consists of days -30 to -1 and the "after filing" period consists of days +1 to +30, where day zero is the day on which the SEC announced the Exchange Act filing. All variables are defined consistently with Table 2 . -30, 1935 (in Panel B) . The "early filers" filed a Form 10 between the first and second of these periods, whereas the "late filers" filed between the second and third. All variables are defined consistently with Table 2 . *, ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (-49,-20) and (20,49) *, ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. *, ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The pre-report period for each company is the 10 trading days ending on day -2 in event time, while the post-report period runs from days -1 to +2 in event time, where day 0 is the day on which the New York Times contained a story reporting the company's earnings. All variables are defined consistently with Table 2 . At time t 0 , the company switches to a more transparent disclosure regime. The solid line shows expected returns thereafter, incorporating a one-time increase in price together with a lower long-run slope, representing lower returns to compensate for lower risk. The dashed line shows expected returns assuming no improvement in disclosure. If actual returns are measured shortly after t 0 and compared to the dashed line, it will appear that improved disclosure resulted in increased returns. If measured later, such as at time t 1 , long-run abnormal returns will approach zero. 
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